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Abstract
The identification of strategic interactions among local governments is typically
plagued by endogeneity problems. This paper proposes an identification strategy that
makes use of a multi-tier federal system. State-level fiscal reforms provide an arguably
exogenous source of variation in tax rates of local jurisdictions. Moreover, state borders
spatially bound the effects of state-level fiscal reforms across areas that are otherwise
highly integrated. Using the fact that local jurisdictions located close to a state border
have some neighbors in another state, I propose to instrument the (average) tax rate of
neighbor jurisdictions with the state-level tax rate of the neighboring state. I use this
instrument to identify strategic personal income tax setting by local jurisdictions in
Switzerland. In contrast to most of the existing empirical literature and to all results
based on standard instruments, I find that tax rates are strategic substitutes in most
cases. Tax rates are found to be strategic complements only in the context of large
tax cuts.
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Tax competition has become one of the most hotly debated economic policy issues
among as well as within nation states. The mobility of tax bases is often seen as placing
an ever more severe constraint on the revenue-raising power of independent jurisdictions.
This mechanism has been modeled formally in a well established theoretical literature
(see, e.g., Wilson, 1999, for a review). Empirically, it has become standard to interpret
positive spatial correlations in tax rates at the sub-national and international level as
evidence of competition over mobile tax bases. I argue that this approach faces two
important challenges. First, it implicitly assumes that tax competition implies strategic
complementarity of competing jurisdictions’ tax rates, even though this need not be the
case in tax competition models. Second, identification of causal interactions is far from
straightforward. My contribution is to propose a new identification method based on an
instrument that exploits multi-tier tax setting in a federal system. Taking this estimation
approach to data for local tax setting in Switzerland, I find that tax rates are strategic
substitutes, except for large tax cuts.
Regarding strategic complementarity, many tax competition models indeed predict
that, in an attempt to retain its mobile tax base, a jurisdiction will lower its tax rate when
tax rates of neighboring jurisdictions fall. Tax reaction functions thus have a positive
slope and tax rates are strategic complements. Yet, this result relies on some specific
assumptions. First, standard models assume governments seek to maximize tax revenues,
with expenditures adjusting through the budget constraint. As Wildasin (1988, 1991)
shows, however, if governments instead optimize over expenditure levels with tax rates
adjusting residually, tax reaction functions have a negative slope and tax rates are strategic
substitutes. In this setting, a jurisdiction that faces a decrease in its tax base through a
more competitive environment will increase its tax rate to maintain its current level of
expenditure, even at the expense of a further adverse effect on its tax base. Second,
even in a model where local governments maximize tax revenue, the slope of the reaction
function depends on the elasticity of substitution between the public and the private good.
As de Mooij and Vrijburg (2012) show, tax rates are strategic complements if public
and private goods are close substitutes (as assumed in standard models) but strategic
substitutes if public and private goods are close complements.1
1See also Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) and Chirinko and Wilson (2013) for a similar argument.
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Empirical evidence has so far pointed towards positively-sloped tax reaction functions
(see, e.g., Allers and Elhorst, 2005, on local tax competition and Devereux et al., 2008, on
international tax competition over corporate tax rates).2 These empirical studies apply
spatial regression models where the tax rate in one jurisdiction is regressed on the average
tax rate of neighboring jurisdictions. Identification of strategic interactions in these models
is however plagued by two-way causality (see, e.g., Brueckner, 2003). The main challenge
consists in disentangling endogenous strategic interactions from unobserved and spatially
correlated characteristics such as preferences, topographical features, or institutions. The
standard estimation method is either to assume that the estimated equation fully describes
the true data generating process and to apply maximum likelihood methods, or to use an
instrumental variable approach taking average characteristics of neighboring jurisdictions
as instruments. As pointed out by Gibbons and Overman (2012), these methods generally
do not offer reliable identification of causal relations. The first approach assumes implausi-
bly that the true data generating process in known. With the second method, instruments
are likely to be invalid due to endogenous population sorting and the existence of spatially
correlated local shocks. The key for identification is to isolate variations in the tax rate of
competing jurisdictions that can be plausibly considered as exogenous.
This paper proposes to make use of a multi-tier federal system. Fiscal reforms at the
(upper-tier) state level provide an arguably exogenous source of variation in the tax rate
levied at the (lower-tier) local level. Moreover, state borders spatially bound the effects of
state-level fiscal reforms across areas that are otherwise highly integrated. I thus propose
to identify strategic interactions among local jurisdictions using the fact that jurisdictions
located close to a state border have some immediate neighbors in another state. As long
as individual local jurisdictions do not significantly affect state-level tax setting, the state-
level tax rate of the neighboring state is a valid instrument for the average tax rate of
neighboring local jurisdictions. I use this new instrument to identify strategic personal
income tax setting by local jurisdictions (municipalities) in Switzerland. I find that, once
I instrument properly in this way, tax reaction functions have a negative slope and hence
that tax rates are strategic substitutes. Decomposing this result according to the sign and
2A notable exception to the prevailing empirical results is the analysis by Chirinko and Wilson (2013)
who find that tax reaction functions for corporate income taxes among U.S. states have a negative slope.
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magnitude of the exogenous tax change suggests that tax rates are strategic complements
only for large tax cuts.
Papers that are methodologically related to this study include Chirinko and Wilson
(2008), Rathelot and Sillard (2008), Duranton et al. (2011) and Rohlin et al. (2014). These
papers use state borders to identify the effect of local taxation on business location in the
U.S., in France and in the UK. They confirm the existence of a tax-induced mobility of
the tax base, but they do not analyze strategic interactions among local jurisdictions.
Departing from estimating a spatial regression model, Lyytika¨inen (2012) uses a fiscal
reform in Finland that raised the minimum property tax rate affecting only a subset of
municipalities to identify tax competition. He finds no evidence for strategic interactions
whereas standard instrumental variables techniques indicate a strong and positive one. Isen
(2014) also finds no evidence for spatial fiscal spillovers among neighboring jurisdictions
in Ohio using close elections of local referenda as source of exogenous increase in taxation.
Agrawal (forthcoming) explores the spatial pattern of local sales tax rates in the U.S.
at state borders where state sales tax rates change discontinuously. His results suggest
that local sales taxes are set as a function of the distance to state borders and of state
tax differentials. Eugster and Parchet (2013) use a cultural border to identify strategic
interactions among municipalities in Switzerland. Exploiting a discrete and measurable
discontinuity in voter preferences between the French-speaking and the German-speaking
regions in Switzerland, they find that tax competition does constrain income taxation of
municipalities at the language border.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 sets out my proposed identification strategy.
Section 2 describes the empirical setting. Section 3 introduces the data while Section 4
presents the baseline results and shows that tax rates are strategic substitutes. Section
5 provides evidence that tax rates are strategic complements only for large negative tax
changes. Section 6 concludes.
1 Identifying strategic interactions at state borders
I exploit two features of a prototypical federal system. First, different levels of govern-
ments, with full or partial fiscal autonomy, share the same tax base. Second, state borders
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bound spatially the effects of state-level fiscal policies across areas that are otherwise
highly integrated. Consider, for simplicity, a federation with two levels of sub-federal
governments that both levy a tax on personal income: states (“cantons” in Switzerland)
levy a tax at rate tc, and municipalities independently levy a tax on the same base at
rate tic. The consolidated state plus municipal personal income tax rate in municipality i
belonging to state c is therefore Tic = tc+tic. With mobile tax bases, this setting gives rise
to two classical externalities studied in the literature: a vertical externality between the
different levels of government that share the same tax base and an horizontal externality
among neighboring jurisdictions with separate but interdependent tax bases (Keen and
Kotsogiannis, 2002).
I propose to identify horizontal strategic interactions among municipalities in their tax
setting by using state-level tax reforms of the neighboring state as a source of exogenous
variation in the taxation of the neighboring municipalities. More specifically, I estimate
the following linear regression model
Tic,t = αT−i,t + β′Xic,t + γi + δc,t + εic,t , (1)
where T−i,t is the weighted average of neighboring municipalities’ consolidated tax rate,
X is a vector of controls, γi and δc,t are municipality and state-year fixed effects, respec-
tively. α is the coefficient of interest designed to measure strategic interactions among
municipalities. Municipality fixed effects control for all unobservable time-invariant and
municipality-specific features. Hence, identification of α is obtained through the compar-
ison of different time-varying patterns in taxes. State-year fixed effects are key for the
identification strategy (see below) by controlling for all events at the state level - including
state strategic tax setting - that affect municipalities in the state simultaneously and iden-
tically. The main issue in the estimation of equation (1) arises because the tax rate of a
neighboring municipality itself depends on the tax rate of municipality i. Moreover, many
time-varying determinants of one jurisdiction’s tax rate, such as local economic conditions,
are likely to be unobservable and spatially correlated, such that T−i,t will inevitably be
correlated with εic,t and the estimation of α will be biased. I propose in this paper to
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instrument T−i,t by the state tax rate of the neighboring state, t−c,t.3
The instrument
Figure 1 illustrates the approach through a map. It shows a municipality i and its four main
neighbors across a state border between two states, A and B.4 T {1,2,3,4} is instrumented by
the state tax rate of state A, tA. Consider that, for reasons unrelated to municipalities 1 to
4, state A raises tA. Under some assumptions on vertical strategic interactions (discussed
below), this raises the consolidated state plus municipal tax rate in municipalities 1 and
2, but does not directly change the tax bill a taxpayer has to pay by living in state B.
Municipalities located in state B have no incentive to change their tax rate, unless tax
bases are mobile and municipalities interact strategically in their tax setting.5 Therefore,
provided that taxpayers care only about their total tax bill and do not react differently
to changes in state-level and municipality-level tax rates, the reaction of municipality i
to a change in tA will reveal the nature of the horizontal strategic interactions among
municipalities.6 Moreover, tA can be used as an instrument for T {1,2,3,4} if it satisfies two
conditions. First, it has to be exogenous to tax decisions of individual municipalities.7
Second, it should be relevant, i.e. it should imply sufficient variation in T {1,2,3,4}.
Regarding the exogeneity condition, a first requirement is that individual municipalities
do not systematically affect state-level tax policies (no reverse causality). This is likely to
be fulfilled in states with a sufficiently high number of municipalities and a population not
too concentrated in municipalities close to one particular state border. To see this, assume
that state A is composed by M municipalities of sizes nj such that the state population
3I thus concentrate on what Agrawal (2014) calls “diagonal externalities”. These externalities are
conceptually different than “pure” horizontal externalities as they involve different levels of government,
but they are empirically equivalent. In contrast to Agrawal (2014), I control for strategic tax interactions
among states and use the tax rate of the neighboring state as an instrument to identify horizontal strategic
interactions among municipalities across a state border.
4The set of strategically relevant municipalities is not known and should be defined according to some
prior. In this illustrative example, a maximum road distance of 5 kilometers between municipalities’ main
towns selects municipalities 1 to 4. The empirical part shows results for different distance bandwidths,
with a baseline cutoff of 10 kilometers.
5I abstract here from political-economy mechanisms (such that “yardstick competition”) that predict
a positive spatial correlation in tax rates among neighboring municipalities, an outcome not supported by
the empirical evidence provided by this paper.
6Taxpayers may be more aware of changes in tax rates at the local level than at the state level. I assume
here that such salience-induced behaviors are absent.
7That is, Cov(t−c,t, εic,t) = 0 in equation (1).
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Figure 1 – Neighboring municipalities across a state border
state B
state A
state C capital city
capital city
capital city
Note: This illustrative map represents municipalities in Switzerland at the state
(cantonal) border between Bern, Aargau and Luzern. State borders are in bold.
Points represent municipalities’ population-weighted centroids. The main neighboring
municipalities of municipality i are in grey. They are selected according to a maximum
road distance to i’s centroid of 5 kilometers.
N =
∑M
j=1 nj . The tax base elasticity of municipality 1 to the tax rate of municipality
i is εn1,ti =
∂n1
∂ti
ti
n1
, whereas the state-level tax base elasticity of state A to the tax rate
of municipality i is εN,ti = εn,ti
n1+n2
N (assuming εn1,ti = εn2,ti = εn,ti). Hence, state A is
unlikely to react to ti provided
n1+n2
N is small enough.
8 Following the empirical literature
on vertical strategic interactions, one may also assume that states act as first movers with
municipalities reacting subsequently (see, e.g., Hayashi and Boadway, 2001). To further
minimize the potential for reverse causality, I shall use t−c,t−1 as instrument.
Second, state-level tax reforms in A should not be driven by some unobserved factors
8Note that any state-level fiscal decisions affect all municipalities similarly in the state, reducing further
the likelihood of a state-level decision driven only by a subset of border municipalities.
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that also affect the taxation decision of municipality i and its neighbors. The key concern
here is the existence of (horizontal) strategic interactions among states themselves. These
strategic interactions are controlled for in equation (1) by the state-year fixed effects δc,t.
These fixed effects capture all state-wide policies in one state as well as all confounding
shocks that affect simultaneously all municipalities in one or in several states. State-
year fixed effects imply that the identification of strategic interactions among neighboring
municipalities stems from the within-state differential response of municipality i to changes
in tA, compared to other municipalities in the same state (state B) not affected by tA, i.e.
municipalities located at another border than the border with state A.9
So far, the instrument and the inclusion of state-year fixed effects capture confounding
factors that occur at a small spatial scale (only border municipalities) or at a large spatial
scale (state-wide shocks). Another concern for the instrument’s validity is the existence
of shocks that may affect the fiscal decision of state A and (only) border municipalities
in state B. This arises if border municipalities share, e.g., the same labor market. Such
local confounding factors will not be captured by state-year fixed effects. Yet, they are
arguably a concern only if state A is a small state. In terms of Figure 1, the exogeneity
assumption requires that state A is a large state with a capital city located “far away”
from municipality i, such that their fiscal decisions are independent. In Section 4.3, I show
that my results are robust to the exclusion of small states (cantons) and of states in which
the capital city of located close to the state border. Note also that fiscal decisions driven
by confounding factors are likely to be positively correlated, thus biasing the estimate of
strategic interactions towards zero if tax rates are strategic substitutes.
Regarding the (first-stage) relevance of the instrument, state-level tax policies should
imply economically and statistically significant variations of T {1,2,3,4}. If this condition
were not satisfied, the instrument would be “weak” and the estimate of strategic interac-
tions would be imprecisely measured and too high (in absolute value).10 The effect of tA
on T {1,2,3,4} depends, first, on the reaction of municipalities 1 and 2, that is on within-state
A vertical interactions. Vertical interactions are even more likely to arise at state borders,
9This strategy comes at the price of discarding from the identifying set all states that share a border
with only one other state.
10In the empirical section, I analyze 30 years of cantonal and municipal personal income taxation in
Switzerland, showing important variations of the cantonal tax rate, both between cantons and over time
(see Section 2).
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where the common tax base may presumably easily relocate to and from another state.11
The net effect of state-level tax policies on the consolidated tax rate of municipalities in
the same state cannot be predicted, since the sign of vertical interactions is ambiguous
(see, e.g., Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002). However, the identification strategy of this paper
requires no prior on this sign. All that is required is that municipalities 1 and 2 do not
exactly offset changes in the state-level tax rate tA. This can be tested by a first-stage
F-test on the instrument.
The quality of the first-stage estimation depends also on the reaction of i’s neighbor
municipalities located on the same side of the state border (municipalities 3 and 4). This
reaction is likely to vary with the distance to the state border. Municipalities located
further away from the border than i may react potentially less to tA. The sign of the tax
reaction function also matters. If tax rates are strategic substitutes, municipalities 3 and 4
will decrease their tax rates to any increase in T1A and T2A. Thus, the average tax rate of
municipalities 1 to 4 may not change, even if T1A and T2A change and strategic interactions
are strong. Overall, the total effect of state-level tax policies on T {1,2,3,4} depends crucially
on the share of neighboring municipalities directly affected by these reforms. I propose to
follow the strategy used in the peer-effects literature and multiply the instrument by the
share of neighboring municipalities located in another state than the state of municipality
i (see, e.g., Moffitt, 2001; Lalive and Cattaneo, 2009). This strategy recognizes the fact
that tax reforms in neighboring state will affect municipalities on the other side of the state
border only if they affect the tax rate of a sufficient number of competing municipalities.
In my illustrative example, T {1,2,3,4} is thus instrumented by tA × 0.5.
Figure 2 plots the distribution of the shares of neighbor municipalities that are located
in another canton than that of the reference municipality (using a 10 kilometers-distance
cutoff). As expected, for most municipalities the majority of their neighbors belongs to the
same canton. Nevertheless, the share of municipalities with a high number of neighbors
in another canton is far from negligible.
I now proceed to apply this identification strategy to strategic personal income tax
setting by Swiss municipalities.
11Bru¨lhart and Jametti (2006) show that vertical interactions between municipalities and cantons play
a significant role in the determination of local tax rates in Switzerland.
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Figure 2 – Distribution of the percentage of neighboring municipalities in Switzerland located in another
canton (state)
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Note: Municipalities have at least one neighboring municipality within a road distance
of 10 kilometers that is located in another canton
2 Setting
Switzerland is a highly decentralized country where the main political units are the 26
cantons and the 2,485 municipalities (in 2012). The number of municipalities per canton
ranges from 3 to a maximum of 382, with an average of 96. In 2012, the average population
per municipality was 3,235 with a maximum of 381,000.
2.1 Personal income taxation
Cantons and municipalities enjoy large fiscal autonomy. About 50% of cantonal and mu-
nicipal revenue are raised through their own taxes. At both levels, the personal income
tax is the main fiscal instrument, accounting for 61% of tax revenue at the cantonal level
and 68% at the municipal level.12 Personal income taxes are residence based, whereas
corporate taxes are source based (with formula apportionment).
Cantons choose multiple aspects of their tax system. First, they set deductions and
exemptions for the definition of the taxable income as well as a complete statutory tax
schedule. Then, they fix annually a multiplier applied to the basic statutory tax schedule,
thus determining applied tax rates in any given year. Any change in the tax base or
12Corporate taxes account for 18% (16% for municipalities) and wealth taxes for 8% (9%) of revenues.
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schedule implies a revision of the fiscal law and is ultimately submitted to a referendum.
In contrast, cantonal multipliers are adapted each year by cantonal parliaments to the
canton’s fiscal objectives.
Municipalities have to apply the cantonal definition of the tax base and schedule but
can decide on a municipal tax multiplier that applies to the basic statutory tax rate.
Municipal multipliers are fixed annually by municipal parliaments or citizen assemblies.13
A central feature of this system is that municipalities are restricted to a single instrument,
their tax multiplier, such that intra-cantonal variation in the consolidated personal income
tax rate is perfectly captured by a single variable, municipal tax multipliers.14
On average, cantonal and municipal taxes account for similar shares of the consolidated
tax liability.15 The average consolidated cantonal plus municipal tax rate for an unmarried
taxpayer with a gross annual income of CHF 1,000,000 (the highest income listed in official
statistics) is 23% in 2012, ranging from 6% to a maximum of 30%.16 The average tax rate
at the cantonal level is 11%, ranging from 3% to 20%. Key to this paper, cantonal tax
rates also exhibit important variation over time (see Appendix Figure A.1).
2.2 Cantonal borders
I concentrate on the consolidated municipal and cantonal tax rate for the personal income
tax in municipalities close to a cantonal border. Figure 3 shows the 1,047 border munici-
palities in Switzerland, defined as having at least one neighbor within a road distance of 10
kilometers that is located in another canton. All border municipalities for which cantonal
borders correspond to topographical particularities like the Alps in the South/South-East
are thus not considered as road distances exceed the cutoff. Cantonal borders mostly
13In most cantons, multipliers are the same for personal income, wealth and corporate taxes. In the few
cases where they differ, cantonal and municipal multipliers remain, in practice, highly correlated. Note
also that, in some cantons, the corporate tax in set only by the canton. Finally, in a majority of cantons,
other entities such as parishes are allowed to set their own tax multiplier. These multipliers are in general
very low.
14Some exceptions exist. In the canton of Neuchaˆtel (before 2001) and in the canton of Solothurn
(before 1986) municipalities were allowed to set their own tax schedule. In the canton of Basel-Stadt (3
municipalities), the municipal tax rate of the municipality of Basel is included into the cantonal tax rate.
As this plausibly violates the exogeneity assumption of the instrument, I drop the canton of Basel-Stadt
from the empirical analysis.
15Important variations across cantons exist. The cantonal share of the consolidated tax liability ranges
from 25% in the canton of Schwyz to 95% in the canton of Glarus.
16In 2012, the average exchange rate was 0.9 Swiss Franc (CHF) to the US dollar.
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Figure 3 – Municipalities within 10 km of a cantonal border
Note: Municipalities in gray have at least one municipality within a road distance of 10 km that is
located in another canton. Cantonal borders are in bold. The canton of Basel-Stadt (3 municipal-
ities) is not used in the sample (see Section 3.2). Road distances are taken from the online route
planner search.ch.
do not coincide with language borders nor do they divide functional labor markets or
other economic institutions. They do not deter mobility either. According to migration
data, 30% of people arriving in or moving out border municipalities in my sample change
their canton of residence (roughly two percent of the corresponding municipal population).
Moreover, 15% of all employed individuals residing in these border municipalities commute
daily to another canton, with an average commuting distance of 17 kilometers (Federal
Population Census 2000).17
In order to gauge the representativeness of the retained sample of municipalities, Table
1 compares population characteristics (nationality, age, income, education), political ori-
entation (support in favor of left-of-center parties), economic activity (employment shares
by sector, unemployment, tourist destination), amenities (no. of movie theaters in the
neighborhood) and geographic features (urban area, area, altitude, lake shore) of border
17This proportion rises to 33% when considering only individuals who work in different municipality
from their municipality of residence.
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Table 1 – Background characteristics of border and non-border municipalities
Border Non-border Difference
municipalities municipalities
in mean
deviation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Background characteristics
Population (in 1,000) 2.46 2.89 −0.43 −15.87%
% Foreign nationals 9.55 10.60 −1.05∗∗∗ −10.33%
% Young (≤ 20) 22.06 21.23 0.83∗∗∗ 3.85%
% Old (≥ 80) 13.09 14.26 −1.17∗∗∗ −8.50%
% Primary sector 16.01 15.11 0.91∗ 5.87%
% Secondary sector 36.87 33.53 3.34∗∗∗ 9.56%
% Tertiary sector 47.11 51.36 −4.25∗∗∗ −8.58%
Unemployment rate 1.44 1.69 −0.26∗∗∗ −16.46%
Total employment (per capita) 0.25 0.28 −0.03∗∗∗ 11.54%
% Votes for left-of-center parties (national elections) 18.91 18.75 0.16 0.85%
Urban area 0.36 0.36 −0.00 0.00%
Center of urban area 0.03 0.03 −0.00 0.00%
Tourist destination 0.01 0.10 −0.09∗∗∗ −150.00%
No. of movie theaters within 10 km 3.13 3.23 −0.10 −3.13%
Lake shore 0.13 0.18 −0.04∗∗∗ −25.00%
Altitude (m.a.s.l.) 535.98 685.98 −150.00∗∗∗ −24.10%
Productive area (km2) 553.11 494.59 58.52∗∗∗ 11.27%
Migration-related characteristics
% top 10% income 8.02 7.67 0.35 4.48%
% bottom 50% income 54.30 57.44 −3.14∗∗∗ −5.60%
Gini index 0.32 0.34 −0.02∗∗∗ −6.06%
% High education (tertiary) 15.93 15.16 0.77∗∗∗ 4.97%
% Intermediate education 79.68 80.82 −1.14∗∗∗ −1.42%
% No education 4.40 4.03 0.37∗∗∗ 8.85%
No. of municipalities 1047 1423
Note: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.10. Border municipalities are defined as having at least one neighboring municipality
within a road distance of maximum 10 km that is located in another canton. Urban area, center of urban area, tourist
destination, and lake shore are binary variables. Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Employment is the total full-time
equivalent employment in the secondary and tertiary sectors. Source: Business Census. Votes for left-of-center parties in
national elections provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Number of theaters within 10 km computed for each
year based on data by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Productive area is the total area minus forest, water and alpine
areas. Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Top 10% income are taxpayers with a taxable income in the highest decile.
Bottom 50% income are taxpayers with a taxable income below the median. In 2010, the top decile includes all taxpayers
with a taxable income over CHF 105,000 (56,000 in 1983) and the median income is CHF 44,000 (24,000 in 1983). Income
shares and the Gini index are computed using the Federal Income Tax statistics from 1983 to 2010. Source: Swiss Federal
Tax Administration, Bern. Other data from the Swiss Federal Census of 1980, 1990 and 2000. Source: Swiss Federal
Statistical Office. Standard errors are clustered two-ways, by municipality and by year.
and non-border municipalities. It appears from column (3) that differences between the
two samples are statistically significant for a majority of background variables. Yet these
differences are economically small. Column (4) reports these differences in percentage de-
viation from their mean. The most important difference is found for the variable “tourist
destination” and reflect the location of most tourist resorts in the Alps. This also explains
the difference in altitude. Other differences are small and I do not expect my conclusions
to be driven by special features of border municipalities selected in my sample.18
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 The estimating equation
My starting point is equation (1)
18As I shall show in Table 2, coefficients measuring the spatial correlation of tax rates for all municipalities
and for border municipalities are not statistically significantly different from each other.
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Tic,t = αT−i,t + β′Xic,t + γi + δc,t + εic,t ,
where
T−i,t =
N∑
j 6=i
wijTj,t .
T−i,t is not restricted to municipalities within the same canton and may include mu-
nicipalities across the canton border.19 wij are ex ante chosen weights. As a baseline
specification, I use uniform weights defined as
wUij =

1
N if dij ≤ D km
0 otherwise ,
(2)
where dij is the shortest road distance between municipalities i and j, N =
∑
1dij≤D km
and D = 10 km.20
Following the discussion in Section 1, T−i,t is instrumented by t−c,t−1 × Sic where
Sic =
N−c
N is the share of neighboring municipalities located in the neighboring canton
(N−c =
∑
1dij≤D and j /∈c). If municipalities have neighbors in more than one canton, the
instrument becomes t−c,t−1 × Sic where t−c,t−1 is constructed with the same weights as
in (2). To take into account any remaining correlations in the error term not captured
by fixed effects, standard errors in all estimations are clustered two-ways, by municipality
and by year.
3.2 Data
My main variable is the consolidated cantonal and municipal personal income tax rate by
municipality between 1983 and 2012.21 These tax rates are published by the Swiss Federal
19For this reason, the variable of interest is the consolidated cantonal and municipal tax rate at the
municipality level, and not municipal tax multipliers that are not comparable across cantons.
20Appendix B presents results with alternative specifications of spatial weights.
21There were 2,485 municipalities in Switzerland in 2012. The canton of Basel-Stadt (3 municipalities)
is dropped because its tax system plausibly violates the exogenity assumption of the instrument required
by the identification strategy of this paper (see footnote 14). The district of Laufen (13 municipalities) and
one municipality in the canton of Jura are dropped because they changed canton during the sample period.
If municipalities merge, the average value of previous jurisdictions is reported for the new jurisdiction
according to the list of municipalities as of December 31, 2012. If municipalities split, the average value of
the new jurisdictions is reported for the previous jurisdictions. This is the case for six existing municipalities
that are not included in the dataset. The merge of the 25 municipalities of the canton of Glarus into three
municipalities in 2011 was not taken into account. Instead, I report missing values for that canton after
14
Tax Administration for a sample of the largest municipalities and are defined as shares of
the consolidated cantonal, municipal and church tax liability in gross annual income for
different categories of taxpayers (unmarried, married without children, married with two
children) and income classes (from CHF 10,000 to CHF 1,000,000). I expand these data
to all municipalities and compute cantonal tax rates for all cantons with a methodology
detailed in the Web Appendix.22
The control vector X in equation (1) contains municipality characteristics including
population, the percentage of foreign nationals, the percentage of young aged less than
20 and old aged more than 80, the percentage of employees in the secondary and tertiary
sectors respectively, total full-time equivalent employment, the unemployment rate, the
share of votes in favor of left-of-center parties in national elections and the number of movie
theaters within 10 km. Average values of these variables for neighboring municipalities are
also included in X with identical spatial weights to those applied to tax rates. Migration-
related characteristics, listed in Table 1, are likely to be endogeneous and therefore not
included in X. Other background characteristics show no or very little variation over
time. They are captured by municipality fixed effects and thus are not included in the
regressions. Note also that state (canton)-year fixed effects in equation (1) restrict the set
of identifying observations to cantons that have more than one neighbor. This implies the
exclusion from the set of identifying observations of 30 municipalities for a distance to a
cantonal border of 10 kilometers.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline results
In the subsequent analysis, the dependent variable is the consolidated tax rate for an
unmarried taxpayer with a gross annual income of CHF 1,000,000. This is the top income
listed in official statistics and refers presumably to the most mobile tax base.23 Results
2011.
22Some special features of the tax system or missing information prevent the computation of cantonal
tax rates in the cantons of Neuchaˆtel (before 2001), Soloturn (before 1986) and Appenzell Innerrhoden
(before 2001). To avoid spurious variation in T−i,t when these cantons appear in the sample, values of
neighboring municipalities are also set to missing.
23This corresponds to the top 0.1% income in 2010. Between 1983 and 2012, cumulative inflation is
60%. Cantons adjust their tax schedule for inflation on a regular basis. Theses adjustments are not a
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Table 2 – Spatial correlations in tax rates
All Border
municipalities municipalities
OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3)
Tax rate of neighboring municipalities 0.439*** 0.412*** 0.662***
(0.030) (0.040) (0.163)
First-stage F-test on instruments 6.053
Over-identification test (pvalue) 0.695
No. of observations 70,127 28,362 28,362
No. of municipalities 2428 1047 1047
No. of years 28.90 27.10 27.10
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.10. The
dependent variable is the consolidated cantonal and municipal tax rate on personal
income for an unmarried taxpayer with a gross annual income of CHF 1,000,000.
Neighboring municipalities are municipalities within a maximum road distance of
10 kilometers (D ≤ 10 km). Border municipalities have at least one neighboring
municipality located in another canton. All estimations include population, %
of foreigners, % of young and old people, % of employees in the secondary and
tertiary sectors, total employment (per capita), unemployment rate, % votes in
favor of left-of-center-parties and no. of movie theaters within 10 km as controls.
Average values of neighboring municipalities are also included as controls. Spatial
weights are uniform. All estimations include municipality and canton-year fixed
effects. Instruments in column (3) are average value of controls in neighboring
municipalities. The over-identification test reports the pvalue of the Hansen J
statistic. Standard errors are clustered two-ways, by municipality and by year.
for other categories of taxpayers are presented in Appendix B.
Table 2 presents results based on equation (1) using the standard approach in the
literature. In column (1), the explanatory variable of interest is the average tax rate of all
neighboring municipalities within a road distance up to 10 kilometers, irrespective of the
canton they belong to. In column (2), I consider only municipalities that have at least one
neighbor located in another canton. These two columns are estimated with OLS, knowing
that they are unlikely to be consistent as the tax rate of neighboring municipalities is
endogenous, thus biasing the estimates upward (Brueckner, 2003). Column (3) follows the
conventional approach in spatial econometrics and instruments the tax rate of neighboring
municipalities with the average background characteristics of these jurisdictions. It thus
assumes - improbably - that background characteristics of neighboring jurisdictions are
orthogonal to unobserved determinants of taxation of municipality i.
All three estimates suggest positive and statistically significant spatial correlations
in tax rates. The first two columns show no difference between border and non-border
municipalities, and the coefficients are comparable to those found in previous studies. The
instrumental variable strategy presented in column (3) does not qualitatively affect our
cause of concern as long as their are exogenous to municipal tax decisions. Only in the canton of Valais,
municipalities fix their own adjustment level.
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Table 3 – Strategic interactions in tax rates: IV strategy
IV Reduced-form First-stage
(Tic) (Tic) (T−i)
(1) (2) (3)
Tax rate of neighboring municipalities -0.497**
(0.219)
Cantonal tax rate of neighb. cantons
x share of municipalities -0.140*** 0.282***
(0.054) (0.052)
First-stage F-test on instrument 29.11
No. of observations 28,362 28,362 28,362
No. of municipalities 1047 1047 1047
No. of years 27.10 27.10 27.10
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.10. The de-
pendent variable is the consolidated cantonal and municipal tax rate on personal
income for an unmarried taxpayer with a gross annual income of CHF 1,000,000.
Neighboring municipalities are municipalities within a maximum road distance of
10 kilometers (D ≤ 10 km). Municipalities have at least one neighboring mu-
nicipality located in another canton. All estimations include population, % of
foreigners, % of young and old people, % of employees in the secondary and ter-
tiary sectors, total employment (per capita), unemployment rate, % votes in favor
of left-of-center-parties and no. of movie theaters within 10 km as controls. Av-
erage values of neighboring municipalities are also included as controls. Spatial
weights are uniform. All estimations include municipality and canton-year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered two-ways, by municipality and by year.
findings. The coefficient is even larger.24
These results are typical for the empirical tax competition literature. The positive
and statistically significant coefficient is interpreted as evidence for the existence of tax
competition over mobile tax bases. Yet, even if the overidentification test does not reject
the null hypothesis of the absence of correlation between the instruments and the error
term, it is hard to be convinced that these standard instruments are truly exogenous, due
to endogenous population sorting and the existence of spatially correlated shocks.25
Table 3 presents results of my instrumental variable strategy. Cantonal tax rates of
neighboring cantons (t−c,t−1), multiplied by the share of municipalities located in these
cantons (Sic), are used to instrument the average tax rate of neighboring municipalities
of municipalities located within a road distance of 10 kilometers from a cantonal border.
The first column reports the IV estimate. The second and third columns decompose the
IV estimates into the effect of the respective instrument on the tax rate of municipal-
ity i (“reduced-form”) and its effect on the endogenous average tax rate of neighboring
municipalities (“first-stage”), respectively.
24This is probably due to a weak instrument problem, as suggested by a first-stage F-test (reported
below coefficient estimates), lying below the critical value of Stock and Yogo (2002).
25Note that the overidentification test is based on the assumption that at least one instrument is valid.
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My central result is shown in the first column.26 The IV estimate implies that a 10
percentage point increase in the average tax rate of neighboring municipalities leads a
municipality to decrease its tax rate by 5 percentage points.27 The reduced-form estimate
presented in column (2) already identifies the existence and the nature of strategic inter-
actions among municipalities. It is negative and quite precisely estimated. The first-stage
coefficient is also statistically significant and the F-test is well above the critical value.28
The properly identified results presented in Table 3 contrast with those presented in
Table 2 and lead to the opposite conclusion on the nature of the strategic tax setting among
neighboring municipalities. Tax reaction functions are found to have a negative slope and
tax rates are thus strategic substitutes rather than strategic complements. Hence, positive
spatial correlations found in Table 2 seem to reflect simultaneous changes in tax rates
due to common shocks or correlated changes in local conditions rather than strategic
decisions. My result also suggests that instrumenting the average tax rate of neighboring
municipalities by the characteristics of these municipalities does not provide the exogenous
source of variation required for identification.
4.2 A pairwise approach
As discussed in Section 1, if tax rates are strategic substitutes, the first-stage estimate in
a spatial regression model may be underestimated, biasing the IV estimate upward. An
alternative strategy is to estimate a pairwise model. Under this approach, equation (1) is
estimated for all pairs of border municipalities that are located in different cantons. It is
thus redefined as:
Tic,t = αT−ic,t + β′Xic,t + γp + δc,t + εic,t , (3)
where T−ic,t is the tax rate of a neighboring municipality located in another canton and
within a road distance of 10 kilometers, and γp is a pair fixed effect. Each pair appears
26The full set of estimated parameters is reported in Appendix Table A.1 (column (3)). Results do not
change if no control variables or if only background characteristics of own municipalities are included in
the regressions. See Appendix Table A.1, column (1) and column(2).
27The average value of the dependent variable, the consolidated cantonal and municipal tax rate for an
unmarried taxpayer with a gross annual income of CHF 1,000,000 is 26%.
28Multiplying the cantonal tax rate of neighboring cantons by the share of municipalities located in these
cantons turns out to be crucial for the relevance of the first-stage estimation. Without this multiplication,
the first-stage coefficient is null and the F-test is far below the critical value. Results available upon request.
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Table 4 – Cross-border interactions: a pairwise approach
IV Reduced-form First-stage
(Tic) (Tic) (T−ic)
(1) (2) (3)
Tax rate of paired municipality -0.332***
(0.091)
Cantonal tax rate of paired canton -0.091*** 0.274***
(0.016) (0.052)
First-stage F-test on instrument 28.15
No. of observations 146,236 146,236 146,236
No. of pairs 5324 5324 5324
No. of years 27.50 27.50 27.50
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.10. The depen-
dent variable is the consolidated cantonal and municipal tax rate on personal income
for an unmarried taxpayer with a gross annual income of CHF 1,000,000. The sam-
ple contains all pairs of municipalities located in two different cantons and within
a maximum road distance of 10 kilometers. Each pair appears (at least) twice. All
estimations include population, % of foreigners, % of young and old people, % of
employees in the secondary and tertiary sectors, total employment (per capita), un-
employment rate, % votes in favor of left-of-center-parties and no. of movie theaters
within 10 km as controls. Values of the paired municipality are also included as con-
trols. All estimations include pair and canton-year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered two-ways, by pair and by year.
twice, with a given municipality being once on the left-hand side and once on the right-
hand side of the equation. The tax rate of the municipality on the right-hand side of the
equation is instrumented by the cantonal tax rate of the canton the municipality belongs to.
Identification relies specifically on cross-border strategic interactions. It discards however
from the analysis the reaction of municipality i to the tax rates of municipalities located
in the same canton and sharing the same cantonal border. If tax rates are strategic
substitutes, municipality i decreases its tax rate for any increase in the tax rate of a
competing municipalities on the other side of the cantonal border. But it decreases less if
other municipalities in the same canton also decrease their tax rate. The pairwise approach
does not control for these “feedback” effects. The estimate of strategic interactions should
then be higher (closer to zero if taxes are strategic substitutes) provided these effects have
the same sign as cross-border interactions.
Table 4 presents results for the 5,324 municipality pairs based on a maximum road
distance of 10 kilometers. These estimates confirm the existence and the nature of strate-
gic interactions among municipalities where taxes are strategic substitutes. Column (3)
shows that the first-stage coefficient is statistically significant and almost identical to the
coefficient presented in Table 3. Reduced-form and IV estimates are however lower (in
absolute value) than the corresponding estimates in Table 3.
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These two approaches can be seen as two bounds for the estimation of the magnitude
of strategic interactions: a 10 percentage points increase in the tax rate of the reference
group leads to a decrease in tax rate between 3 and 5 percentage points.
4.3 Robustness
The validity of the identification strategy depends crucially on the exogeneity of the in-
strument. Canton-level fiscal reforms have to be orthogonal to unobserved determinants
of taxation of municipalities located on the other side of the cantonal border. Concerns
arise mainly if cantons substitute for fiscal decisions of border municipalities or if cantons
and border municipalities react to a common shock. This could be an issue especially in
small cantons where a high share of the cantonal population live in border municipalities
or if the capital city is located close to a cantonal border.
Table 5 presents results of the IV strategy for a subset of “big” cantons. The share
of the cantonal population living in border municipalities is computed for each canton
pair. In column (1), cantons in which 70% or more of the cantonal population reside in
municipalities located at one particular cantonal border are dropped. In columns (2), (3)
and (4), the maximum population share is lowered to 50%, 40% and 30%, respectively.
In column (5), all cantons in which the capital city is located within 10 kilometers from
the cantonal border are dropped. This excludes from the analysis 4 cantons in column
(1), 6 cantons in column (2), 9 cantons in column (3), 11 cantons in column (4) and 11
(different) cantons in column (5).29 All municipalities sharing a border with these cantons
are also discarded.
The first line of Table 5 reports IV estimates while the second reports reduced-form
estimates. All coefficients are negative and precisely estimated, with the exception of the
most restrictive specification in column (4) where the effect is identified using only 258
municipalities.30 Baseline results are therefore robust to the exclusion of small cantons in
29These cantons are Appenzell Innerrhoden, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Basel-Landschaft and
Schaffhausen in column (1). In column (2), Zug and Solothurn are also dropped. Column (3) discards also
Nidwalden, St. Gallen and Thurgau while column (4) also excludes Fribourg and Neuchaˆtel. In column
(5), Appenzell Innerrhoden, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Basel-Landschaft, Schaffhausen, Zug, Solothurn, St.
Gallen, Thurgau, Aargau, Ticino and Luzern are discarded.
30This is not surprising given that, with canton-year fixed effects, the identifying set of observations is
restricted to cantons which share a border with at least to other cantons.
20
Table 5 – Strategic interactions in big cantons
Maximum population share
at one cantonal border
70% 50% 40% 30% no capital city
at border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tax rate of neighboring municipalities -0.322* -0.458* -0.797** -0.222 -1.085***
(0.175) (0.241) (0.392) (0.285) (0.419)
Reduced form
Instrument -0.125* -0.156** -0.187** -0.075 -0.271***
(0.065) (0.079) (0.080) (0.096) (0.093)
First stage F-test on instrument 52.25 61.35 26.95 36.50 26.06
No. of observations 23,730 17,509 13,769 7,482 9,071
No. of municipalities 864 629 499 258 337
No. of years 27.50 27.80 27.60 29 26.90
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.10. In column (1), cantons in which
70% of the cantonal population lives in municipalities located at one particular cantonal border are dropped.
In columns (2), (3) and (4) this threshold is lowered to 50%, 40% and 30%, respectively. In column (4)
cantons in which the capital city is located within 10 km from a cantonal border are dropped. The de-
pendent variable is the consolidated cantonal and municipal tax rate on personal income for an unmarried
taxpayer with a gross annual income of CHF 1,000,000. The instrument is the cantonal tax rate of neigh-
boring cantons multiplied by the share of neighboring municipalities located in these cantons. Neighboring
municipalities are municipalities within a maximum road distance of 10 kilometers (D ≤ 10 km). Mu-
nicipalities have at least one neighboring municipality located in another canton. All estimations include
population, % of foreigners, % of young and old people, % of employees in the secondary and tertiary
sectors, total employment (per capita), unemployment rate, % votes in favor of left-of-center-parties and
no. of movie theaters within 10 km as controls. Average values of neighboring municipalities are also
included as controls. Spatial weights are uniform. All estimations include municipality and canton-year
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered two-ways, by municipality and by year.
which the exogeneity assumption is less likely to hold. Strikingly enough, the coefficient
is higher (in absolute value) as one “zooms in” the bigger cantons (with the exception
of column (4)). As expected, potential violations of the exogeneity assumption bias the
estimate of strategic interactions towards zero if tax rates are strategic substitutes.
Further robustness checks are presented in Appendix B. In Appendix B.1, I explore
alternative spatial weights and show that strategic interactions are stronger among proxi-
mate jurisdictions (see also Section 5.1 below). Results presented in Appendix B.2 indicate
that municipalities react to changes in tax rates targeting high-income taxpayers, but not
to changes for other categories of taxpayers. I Appendix B.3 I show that results are also
robust to the inclusion of several lags in order to take account of possible delays in tax
adjustments.
4.4 Discussion
Results of this paper contrast to most of existing empirical findings. Tax rates as strategic
substitutes are however fully consistent with several models of local tax setting. One
explanation is that local government primarily target expenditure and adjust their tax rate
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residually (Wildasin, 1988, 1991).31 Several features of the Swiss fiscal system makes this
explanation highly plausible. First, Koethenbuerger (2011) notes that the fiscal capacity
equalization scheme subsidizing local taxation in Switzerland, should provide an incentive
for municipalities to maintain their current level of expenditure. Second, as municipalities
fix only a single multiplier of the cantonal tax schedule, tax rates can be easily adjusted
annually while expenditure are plausibly more sticky, at least in the short term.
Third, balance budget requirements at the municipality level may also reinforce an
expenditure-preservation strategy. In the great majority of cantons, several “debt-brake”
measures (restrictions on current account deficits and/or compulsory deficit amortization)
limit the taxation of municipalities (see Appendix Table C.1 for an overview of current
cantonal laws that regulate the budgeting process of municipalities). Under these rules,
current budget deficits that follow a decrease in the tax base when neighboring tax rates
fall, have to be amortized in the next budget, which must be balanced. Municipalities are
then arguably more likely to increase their tax rate (and reduce their expenditure) rather
than to preserve their tax base by lowering their tax rate (which should be compensated by
further expenditure reductions). Moreover, in several cantons, the municipal tax multiplier
has to be set such as to exactly balance the budget. A striking example is the canton of
Ticino, in which municipalities, before 2012, should follow a mechanical rule in fixing their
tax multiplier, that had to be equal to their (foreseen) fiscal needs divided by their tax
base. In other cantons, the cantonal authority can fix (and increase) the municipal tax
rate if the municipality takes no step to balance its accounts.32
5 Extensions
5.1 The spatial reach of strategic interactions
Table 6 explores the spatial reach of strategic interactions, that is the distance up to
which municipalities interact strategically in their tax setting. Columns (1) to (4) show
how municipalities located at different distances from a cantonal border react to changes
31As mentioned in the Introduction, another explanation is related to the elasticity of substitution
between the public and the private good (de Mooij and Vrijburg, 2012; See also Brueckner and Saavedra,
2001 and Chirinko and Wilson, 2013).
32A complete analysis of the effect of different budgetary rules on municipal tax policy is beyond the
scope of this paper and is left to future research.
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Table 6 – Strategic interactions in tax rates for different distance bandwidths
Distance to cantonal border
0-5 km 5-10 km 10-15 km 15-20 km
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: D = 5 km
Cantonal tax rate of neighboring cantons -0.157***
(0.046)
No. of observations 13,128
Panel B: D = 10 km
Cantonal tax rate of neighboring cantons -0.157*** -0.067**
(0.045) (0.032)
No. of observations 13,036 15,326
Panel C: D = 15 km
Cantonal tax rate of neighboring cantons -0.161*** -0.081** -0.136***
(0.042) (0.034) (0.050)
No. of observations 12,780 14,997 9,597
Panel D: D = 20 km
Cantonal tax rate of neighboring cantons -0.167*** -0.076** -0.141*** 0.004
(0.041) (0.036) (0.051) (0.028)
No. of observations 12,462 14,802 9,401 7,057
No. of municipalities 479 568 351 267
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.10. The dependent vari-
able is the consolidated cantonal and municipal tax rate on personal income for an unmarried
taxpayer with a gross annual income of CHF 1,000,000. Neighboring cantons are selected such
that at least one neighboring municipality is located in these cantons. Neighboring municipal-
ities are municipalities within a maximum road distance of 5, 10, 15, and 20, respectively. All
estimations include population, % of foreigners, % of young and old people, % of employees
in the secondary and tertiary sectors, total employment (per capita), unemployment rate, %
votes in favor of left-of-center-parties and no. of movie theaters within 10 km as controls.
Average values of neighboring municipalities are also included as controls. Spatial weights are
uniform. All estimations include municipality and canton-year fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered two-ways, by municipality and by year.
in the cantonal tax rate of neighboring cantons. For this analysis, the cantonal tax rate
of neighboring cantons is not multiplied by the share of municipalities located in these
cantons. Panels A to D present the associated maximum road distance D used to select
neighboring cantons in the four distance bandwidths.
Results suggest that municipal tax decisions interact more the closer the municipalities
are located to the cantonal border. The effect is the strongest (in absolute value) between
0 and 5 kilometers from the border, decreases rapidly between 5 and 10 kilometers, and
increases again between 10 and 15 kilometers. This pattern is consistent with tax rates
being strategic substitutes. Municipalities between 15 and 20 kilometers do not react
to fiscal reforms of neighboring cantons suggesting that strategic interactions are bound
spatially. The spatial reach of strategic interactions can thus be estimated to be of some
15 kilometers.33
33This result is in line with the findings of Eugster and Parchet (2013).
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Table 7 – Heterogeneity of strategic interactions
Tax change in neighboring canton
50% 50%
Most negative Negative Positive Most positive
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax rate of neighboring municipalities 0.194 -0.392 -0.716** -0.315
(0.118) (0.248) (0.308) (0.286)
Reduced form
Instrument 0.102 -0.159 -0.195** -0.113
(0.063) (0.098) (0.086) (0.107)
First-stage F-test on instrument 24.87 24.64 12.51 8.72
No. of observations 9,605 20,447 7,148 1,859
No. of municipalities 361 767 280 94
No. of years 26.60 26.70 25.50 19.80
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.10. Tax change in neighboring
cantons is the average yearly growth rate of cantonal tax rates over the sample period. The dependent
variable is the consolidated cantonal and municipal tax rate on personal income for an unmarried taxpayer
with a gross annual income of CHF 1,000,000. The instrument is the cantonal tax rate of neighboring
cantons multiplied by the share of neighboring municipalities located in these cantons. Neighboring
municipalities are municipalities within a maximum road distance of 10 kilometers (D ≤ 10 km). Mu-
nicipalities have at least one neighboring municipality located in another canton. All estimations include
population, % of foreigners, % of young and old people, % of employees in the secondary and tertiary
sectors, total employment (per capita), unemployment rate, % votes in favor of left-of-center-parties and
no. of movie theaters within 10 km as controls. Average values of neighboring municipalities are also
included as controls. Spatial weights are uniform. All estimations include municipality and canton-year
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered two-ways, by municipality and by year.
5.2 Heterogeneity of strategic interactions
Table 7 explores whether municipalities react differently to a positive and a negative change
in the tax rate of neighboring cantons. With mobile tax bases, any increase (decrease) in
the cantonal tax rate of neighboring cantons, and thus in the average tax rate of municipal-
ities located in these cantons, implies a positive (negative) revenue shock for municipalities
located on the other side of the cantonal border. Columns (2) and (3) present results for
negative, respectively positive changes, while columns (1) and (4) concentrates on the 50%
most negative (positive) changes.
I find that municipalities react differently to positive and negative tax rate changes
by neighbors. As shown in columns (3) and (4), municipalities decrease their tax rate
if competing municipalities increase their tax rate.34 Interestingly, results in column (1)
show that municipalities react positively to large negative shocks by reducing their tax
rate (results are borderline statistically significant). In this case, tax rates are not strategic
substitutes but strategic complements. This indicates that strategic interactions among
municipalities are to some extent asymmetric. One explanation could be that munici-
34Small and statistically insignificant coefficients in column (4) may be due to the small sample size.
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palities, overall, adjust residually their tax rate to keep their expenditure fixed, even at
the expense of an adverse effect on their tax base. However, if their neighbors lower tax
rates significantly (one might be tempted to say “aggressively”), they appear to primarily
target tax revenue and therefore lower their tax rate to retain their tax base. This sug-
gests that targeting primarily expenditure could be too costly in terms of taxpayers if the
competition from neighboring jurisdictions is fierce.
6 Conclusions
I propose a method for identifying strategic interactions among local tax policies. Us-
ing exogenous variations in the tax rate of lower-level jurisdictions due to tax reforms in
upper-level jurisdictions, I can identify strategic interactions among lower-level jurisdic-
tions across a upper-lever jurisdictional border. This strategy is applied to Swiss munici-
palities and could also be taken to other federal countries, such as the U.S., where different
levels of governments tax a common base (e.g. sales taxes).
In contrast to most existing findings, my results indicate that municipal tax reaction
functions mostly have a negative slope, and that taxes rates are therefore strategic sub-
stitutes. This is consistent with a model of local tax setting where governments primarily
target expenditure and adjust their tax rate residually, even at the expense of an adverse
effect on the tax base. This behavior is also in line with “debt-brake” measures that govern
the budgeting process of Swiss municipalities.
This paper also shows that tax rates are strategic complements if municipalities face
large tax cuts by neighboring jurisdictions. The hypothesis that emerges is that munici-
palities aim to maintain a fixed level of expenditure and adjust their tax rates for small
revenue shocks residually, even if this affects negatively their tax base. This reflects prob-
ably the most common situation since, in the short run, tax rates can be more easily
adjusted than public spending. However, municipalities engage in tax competition if they
face large competitive shocks, suggesting the existence of a threshold for negative revenue
shocks above which local governments primarily target the preservation of their tax base.
Further research might integrate this hypothesis in the explanation of the decision by local
governments of their public policy.
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A Appendix
Figure A.1 – Evolution of the cantonal personal income tax rate for an unmarried taxpayer with gross
annual income of CHF 1,000,000
Note: Cantonal tax rates are computed using the methodology described in Section 3.2.
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Table A.1 – Strategic interactions in tax rates
no controls X X, X¯
(1) (2) (3)
Tax rate of neighboring municipalities -0.569** -0.478** -0.497**
(0.256) (0.228) (0.219)
Population -0.080 -0.128**
(0.060) (0.062)
% Foreigners 0.031*** 0.025***
(0.010) (0.009)
% Young (≤ 20) 0.003 0.006
(0.008) (0.008)
% Old (≥ 65) -0.033 -0.023
(0.022) (0.021)
% Secondary sector -0.035*** -0.029***
(0.007) (0.006)
% Tertiary sector -0.026*** -0.019***
(0.007) (0.006)
Unemployment rate 0.024 0.023
(0.019) (0.019)
Total employment (per capita) -0.342 -0.445
(0.486) (0.463)
% Votes for left-of-center parties -0.007* -0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
No. of movie theaters within 10 km -0.001 -0.012
(0.010) (0.015)
Population in neighboring mun. 0.180
(0.141)
% Foreigners in neighboring mun. 0.091**
(0.044)
% Young (≤ 20) in neighboring mun. 0.024
(0.038)
% Old (≥ 65) in neighboring mun. -0.200**
(0.100)
% Secondary sector in neighboring mun. -0.025
(0.018)
% Tertiary sector in neighboring mun. -0.072**
(0.028)
Unemployment rate in neighboring mun. 0.039
(0.067)
Total employment (per capita) in neighboring mun. 2.780*
(1.643)
% Votes for left-of-center parties in neighboring mun. -0.005
(0.006)
No. of movie theaters within 10 km in neighboring mun. -0.017
(0.029)
First-stage F-test 24.53 26.03 29.10
No. of observations 28,362 28,362 28,362
No. of municipalities 1047 1047 1047
No. of years 27.10 27.10 27.10
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.10. The dependent variable is the
consolidated cantonal and municipal tax rate on personal income for an unmarried taxpayer with a
gross annual income of CHF 1,000,000. The instrument is the cantonal tax rate of neighboring cantons
multiplied by the share of neighboring municipalities located in these cantons. Neighboring municipal-
ities are municipalities within a maximum road distance of 10 kilometers (D ≤ 10 km). Municipalities
have at least one neighboring municipality located in another canton. Spatial weights are uniform. All
estimations include municipality and canton-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered two-ways,
by municipality and by year.
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B Robustness checks
B.1 Alternative spatial weights
In Table B.1, I explore alternative specifications of spatial weights wij . Column (1) repeats
for convenience the baseline result of Table 3. Column (2) follows the assumption that
interactions are stronger the closer municipalities are in terms of road distance. Thus,
inverse-distance weights are defined as
wDij =

1
dij∑ 1
dij
if dij ≤ D km
0 otherwise .
(4)
Spatial weights in column (3) are defined according to relative population. If big
municipalities act as “leader”, more weight should given to neighboring municipalities
that are bigger in terms of population:
wPij =

popj
popi∑ popj
popi
if dij ≤ D km
0 otherwise .
(5)
A last specification assumes that jurisdictions react not to the average tax rate of
neighboring municipalities but to the lowest tax rate:
wMijt =
 1 if Tjt = min(Tkt) ∀k, dik ≤ D km0 otherwise . (6)
In columns (2) and (3), newly defined average tax rates of neighboring municipalities
are instrumented with the cantonal tax rate of neighboring cantons, multiplied with the
share of the total distance, respectively population, represented by municipalities in these
cantons. In column (4), the instrument is the minimum cantonal tax rate of neighboring
cantons.
Results suggest that strategic interactions are more intense among municipalities that
are geographically close. Both IV and reduced-form estimates are higher (in absolute
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Table B.1 – Alternative spatial weights
Spatial weights
Uniform Distance Population Minimum
wU wD wP wM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax rate of neighboring municipalities -0.497** -0.634*** -0.358* -0.852
(0.219) (0.204) (0.184) (0.560)
Reduced form
Instrument -0.140*** -0.191*** -0.111** -0.099***
(0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.030)
First-stage F-test on instrument 29.11 46.29 33.48 5.424
No. of observations 28,362 28,362 28,362 27,582
No. of municipalities 1047 1047 1047 1028
No. of years 27.10 27.10 27.10 26.80
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.10. The dependent vari-
able is the consolidated cantonal and municipal tax rate on personal income for an unmarried
taxpayer with a gross annual income of CHF 1,000,000. In column (1), the instrument is the
cantonal tax rate of neighboring cantons multiplied by the share of neighboring municipalities
located in these cantons. In columns (2) and (3), the cantonal tax rate is multiplied by the
share of total distance, respectively population, represented by municipalities in neighboring
cantons. In column (4), the instrument is the lowest cantonal tax rate among neighboring
cantons. Neighboring municipalities are municipalities within a maximum road distance of 10
kilometers (D ≤ 10 km). Municipalities have at least one neighboring municipality located
in another canton. All estimations include population, % of foreigners, % of young and old
people, % of employees in the secondary and tertiary sectors, total employment (per capita),
unemployment rate, % votes in favor of left-of-center-parties and no. of movie theaters within
10 km as controls. Average values of neighboring municipalities are also included as con-
trols. All estimations include municipality and canton-year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered two-ways, by municipality and by year.
value) in column (2) than the baseline of column (1). Coefficients in column (3), where
large municipalities are assumed to be dominant players are slightly lower (in absolute
value) than in the baseline. In the last column, municipalities are found to react to
the lowest tax rate among their neighboring municipalities. The first-stage F-test however
indicates that instruments are rather weak leading to an upward biased (in absolute value)
and more imprecise IV estimate. The weak instrument problem in this case arises because
the lowest consolidated tax rate is not necessarily found in the neighboring canton with
the lowest cantonal tax rate.
B.2 Tax competition for different categories of taxpayers
So far, my dependent variable has been the consolidated cantonal and municipal tax
rate on personal income for an unmarried taxpayer with a gross annual income of CHF
1,000,000. Table B.2 presents results for unmarried taxpayers and married taxpayers
with two children, each with a gross annual income of CHF 50,000, 100,000, 500,000 and
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1,000,000.35
I find that strategic interactions are indeed identified for high-income unmarried tax-
payers but not for other income classes. IV estimates are negative for all categories (except
one) but statistically significant only for unmarried taxpayers with a gross income of CHF
500,000 and CHF 1,000,000 and married taxpayers with two children and a gross annual
income of CHF 1,000,000. This suggests that municipalities react only to changes in
the cantonal tax schedule that affect top-income taxpayers who presumably are the most
mobile.
B.3 Strategic interactions in the long run
The analysis modeled by equation (1) concentrates on contemporaneous reactions to
changes in the average tax rate of neighboring municipalities. This may not capture
the full effect of strategic interactions if municipalities respond with a delay. Table B.3
presents therefore results for two dynamic versions of equation (1). Columns (1) and (2)
show the estimation of an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model with one and two
lags respectively. ADL models augment equation (1) by including the lagged dependent
variable and lagged independent variables on the right-hand side. These models nest the
most widely used dynamic processes but cannot be consistently estimated by fixed-effects
OLS estimators.36 Columns (3) to (7) report distributed lag models up to five lags. These
models do not include the lagged dependent variable and thus can be consistently esti-
mated. Note that the autoregressive model in column (1) is nested in a distributed lag
model with an infinite number of lags.
Implied long-run IV coefficients are computed as the sum of coefficients on the tax rate
of neighboring municipalities, divided by one minus the sum of coefficients on the lagged
dependent variable for autoregressive distributed lag models in columns (1) and (2). Long-
run reduced-form coefficients are computed analogously. They are reported at the bottom
of Table B.3 together with their associated statistical significance levels. Baseline results
for the reduced-form estimates are confirmed. Long-run coefficients are always negative
35A gross annual income of CHF 50,000 corresponds approximately to the median income over the period
1983-2010. A gross annual income of CHF 100,000 corresponds to the top 10%, a gross annual income of
CHF 500,000 to the top 0.5% and a gross annual income of CHF 1,000,000 to the top 0.1%.
36The size of the bias shrinkes, however, with the number of time periods (Nickell, 1981).
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Table B.3 – Strategic interactions in the long run
Autoregressive
Distributed Lag Model Distributed Lag Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable (t-1) 0.876*** 0.872***
(0.047) (0.193)
Dependent variable (t-2) -0.030
(0.072)
Tax rate of neighboring municipalities (t) 1.383 2.867 7.763 12.541 4.988 -2.096 -2.168
(3.321) (8.061) (15.965) (26.696) (8.067) (3.687) (8.321)
Tax rate of neighboring municipalities (t-1) -1.299 -2.639 -7.333 -11.586 -4.663 1.684 1.865
(2.992) (7.340) (14.334) (24.314) (7.238) (3.243) (7.720)
Tax rate of neighboring municipalities (t-2) 0.068 0.262 0.107 -0.077 -0.094
(0.272) (1.068) (0.371) (0.321) (0.240)
Tax rate of neighboring municipalities (t-3) -0.267 -0.093 -0.095
(0.219) (0.387) (0.356)
Tax rate of neighboring municipalities (t-4) -0.524 -0.497
(0.602) (1.599)
Tax rate of neighboring municipalities (t-5) 0.023
(1.311)
First-stage F-test on instruments 0.109 0.044 0.132 0.062 0.087 0.067 0.023
No. of observations 27,315 26,268 27,315 26,268 25,221 24,174 23,127
No. of municipalities 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047
No. of years 26.10 25.10 26.10 25.10 24.10 23.10 22.10
Long-term effect of tax rate of neighb. mun. 0.392 2.447 0.266 1.685 0.106 -1.147 -0.951
Test long-term effect = 0 (pval) 0.833 0.706 0.828 0.745 0.910 0.279 0.250
Long-term effect of instrument -0.214 -0.244 -0.159 -0.183 -0.206 -0.218 -0.229
Test long-term effect = 0 (pval) 0.051 0.035 0.010 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.10. The dependent variable is the consolidated cantonal and
municipal tax rate on personal income for an unmarried taxpayer with a gross annual income of CHF 1,000,000. instruments are the
cantonal tax rate of neighboring cantons (multiplied by the share of neighboring municipalities located in these cantons) and their
lags. Neighboring municipalities are municipalities within a maximum road distance of 10 kilometers (D ≤ 10 km). Municipalities
have at least one neighboring municipality located in another canton. All estimations include population, % of foreigners, % of young
and old people, % of employees in the secondary and tertiary sectors, total employment (per capita), unemployment rate, % votes in
favor of left-of-center-parties and no. of movie theaters within 10 km as controls. Average values of neighboring municipalities are
also included as controls. Spatial weights are uniform. All estimations include municipality and canton-year fixed effects. Implied
long-run coefficients are computed as the sum of coefficients on the respective variable, divided by one minus the sum of coefficients
on the lagged dependent variable in columns (1) and (2). Standard errors are clustered two-ways, by municipality and by year.
and larger (in absolute value) than the baseline. They are also statistically significant at
conventional levels. Long-run IV estimates are however not precisely estimated and not
meaningful. This is due to a weak first stage as indicated by the first-stage F-test.37
37Note that the tax rate of neighboring municipalities and its lags are instrumented by the cantonal tax
rate of the neighboring canton and its lags, and that instruments are already included with one-year lag.
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C Budgetary rules
Table C.1 – Budgetary rules at the municipality level
“Debt-brake” measures Role of municipal tax
Canton Current account Budget deficit Budget setting Sanction
deficit amortization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aargau (AG) only if covered 30% each year
by net wealth
Appenzell Ausserrhoden (AR) only if covered within 7 years tax fixed
by net wealth by canton
Appenzell Innerrhoden (AI) n/a n/a n/a n/a
Basel-Landschaft (BL)
Basel-Stadt (BS) n/a n/a n/a n/a
Bern (BE) only if covered within 8 years tax fixed
by net capital by canton
Fribourg (FR) no higher than minimum rate tax increase
5 % of revenue (no deadline)
Geneva (GE) only if covered within 4 years tax fixed
by net capital by canton
Glarus (GL) within 5 years
Graubu¨nden (GR) 20% balance budget
(no deadline) (medium-term)
Jura (JU)
Luzern (LU)
Neuchaˆtel (NE) only if covered 20% tax fixed
by net capital (no deadline) by canton
Nidwalden (NW) 10%
(no deadline)
Obwalden (OW) no higher than within 8-10 years
10% of revenue
Schaffhausen (SH) minimum rate
(no deadline)
Schwyz (SZ) only if covered within 5 years balance budget
by net capital (strict rule)
Solothurn (SO) balance budget
(medium-term)
St. Gallen (SG) only if covered within 2 years balance budget tax fixed
by net capital (strict rule) by canton
Thurgau (TG) within 5 years tax increase
Ticino (TI) within 4 years balance budget tax fixed
(strict rule) by canton
Uri (UR) within 6 years
Valais (VS) only if covered within 4 years
by net capital
Vaud (VD) debt limit
Zug (ZG) within 3 years
Zu¨rich (ZH) only if covered within 5 years balance budget
by net capital (strict rule)
Note: Municipality-level budgetary rules as stated in current cantonal laws.
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